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Achieving Procedural Goals through Indirection:
the Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify Contingency
Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements
MoRRIs A. RATNER*
ABSTRACT
Non-class aggregate settlement practices have outpaced the development of
legal doctrine in multidistrict litigations (MDLs). Forced to improvise, trial
courts have sought a firm foundationfor exercising authority over these private,
contractualsettlements, specifically to justify and guide court control over attorneys'fees. By imposing across-the-boardlimits on contingency fees recoverable by individually-retainedcounsel, MDL trial courts have effectively rewrittenfee contracts between lawyers and clients in tens of thousands of cases.
The trial courts in three recent proceedings-Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexagroundedfee cap orders in their "inherentauthority" to regulate members of the
bar to enforce ethics rules. But the fee-capping decisions in these cases stray
dramatically from the ethics doctrine that purportedly informs them. This
boundary-pushing reliance on ethics serves proceduralgoals, i.e., making room
for enhanced attorneys'fees to court-appointed common benefit counsel who
achieved global settlements. Unresolved tension within the MDL governance
regime regarding the extent to which MDL aggregation converts individual
litigation to group litigationpartly explains this misuse of ethics doctrine, one
which potentially delays the development of clear answers to difficult questions
about MDL aggregationprocedures and specifically about the properuse of the
attorneys'fee lever as an MDL case management tool. Those questions can and
should be answered by Congress or by trial courtjudges directly as procedural
questions, ratherthan indirectly as ethics questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike the current federal rule of procedure governing class actions,' the
multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute 28 U.S.C. § 1407 provides no direction to
trial courts regarding the treatment of attorneys' fees in MDLs resolved by global
settlement. Courts overseeing non-class aggregate settlements have thus improvised to define a doctrinal foundation for exercising authority over fees, and
specifically for allocating fees among layers of counsel who prosecute such
cases, 2 including the lawyers plaintiffs choose to prosecute their individual cases
and the lawyers appointed by MDL trial courts to perform work for the benefit of
all plaintiffs.3 The recent attorneys' fee decisions in the product liability MDLs
Vioxx, 4 Guidant,5 and Zyprexa6 are instructive. In each of these proceedings,
transfer and coordination of related cases in the federal system to a single judge
for pre-trial purposes resulted in non-class aggregate settlements, providing the
MDL trial courts with an opportunity to decide how much to pay court-appointed
common benefit counsel. This question naturally caused courts to worry about
the amounts that individual plaintiffs were contractually obligated to pay their
individually-retained attorneys. Because of this scrutiny, each trial court imposed

1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
2. See Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships,Representation,and Fees, 71 N.YU. L. REv. 296, 300-304, 328, 355 (1996) [hereinafter Resnik,
Curtis & Hensler] (referring to and identifying the "layers of lawyers" who prosecute MDLs).
3. The term "individually-retained lawyers" refers to lawyers retained by individual plaintiffs to handle their
claims. The term "court-appointed common benefit counsel" refers to lawyers appointed by the MDL trial
courts to perform common benefit work on behalf of all MDL plaintiffs.
4. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557-62 (E.D. La. 2009). Judge Eldon Fallon
capped contingent fee arrangements between over 50,000 plaintiffs participating in the $4.5 billion non-class
aggregate settlement and their individually-retained attorneys at 32%, with the possibility of an upward
departure in rare cases. See id. The Vioxx litigation and settlement involved personal injury claims related to
Merck's prescription pain killer Vioxx, which was withdrawn from the market after data from a clinical trial
indicated that use of it increased the risk of heart attacks. See generally id. Judge Fallon also awarded 6.5% to
court-appointed common benefit counsel, which was included in the 32% cap. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig,
760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (E.D. La. 2010).
5. See generally In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708
(DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). Judge Donovan Frank set aside approximately 15% of
a $240 million settlement fund to compensate attorneys who performed common benefit work with regard to
approximately 4,000 lawsuits, and, also, initially capped contingency fees of individually-retained counsel at
20%, subject to appeal to a special master for an upward departure based on certain limited factors. See id. at *9,
*14. Judge Frank eventually modified the fee orders to cap the total fee payment of any plaintiff, accounting for
the common benefit fee, at the lesser of 37.18%, the contractually negotiated fee percentage, or the
state-imposed limit. See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 WL 3896006,
at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008).
6. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490-491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge Jack
Weinstein capped contingency fees of individually-retained counsel for approximately 8,000 plaintiffs at 20%
for plaintiffs receiving a $5,000 lump sum payment and 35% for plaintiffs receiving more, but allowed for
departures based on the unique facts of each case, in this $700 million non-class aggregate settlement of
personal injury claims against defendant Eli Lilly & Company relating to the prescription drug Zyprexa which
was used to treat schizophrenia and/or bipolar disorder.
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caps on contingency fees that could be charged by individually-retained
lawyers.7 In each case, the courts claimed multiple sources of authority to impose
such caps, including: the court's equitable power to promote fairness among
litigants; powers implied by the MDL statute; the terms of the MDL global
settlement agreements, which empowered the trial courts to review fees; and the
court's "inherent authority" to regulate counsel to prevent unethically excessive
fees, and thus to maintain the integrity and esteem of the bar.
After briefly describing these distinct justifications for imposing fee caps in
Section II, this Article focuses in Section III on the trial courts' grounding of the
contingency fee caps in their "inherent authority" to enforce ethical prohibitions
against excessive fees; as demonstrated below, ethics doctrine is ill-suited as a
basis for the fee caps, because it envisions particularized inquiries, and functions
to define only what is unreasonably excessive, without answering the more
precise procedural questions" the courts' intervention in attorneys' fees entailed.
The procedural issues the ethics doctrine leaves unanswered include questions
regarding precisely how the fee lever-i.e., the payment of common benefit fees
-should be used to promote the "just and efficient" 9 management of transferred
and coordinated actions, including goals long recognized and pursued by
harnessing attorneys' fees in class actions,o such as facilitating aggregation both
by making it profitable for counsel to represent the class," and by aligning the
interests of class counsel and the absent class members through the methods used
to calculate fees. 1 2 These procedural choices can be made either via statutory

7. See supra notes 4-6.
8. See Howard M. Erichson, Foreword-Civil Procedureand the Legal Profession, 79 FORDHAM L. REv.
1827, 1832 (2011) ("What's the difference between a proceduralist and an ethicist? In their examinations of
civil litigation, both proceduralists and ethicists look at problems transsubstantively . .. and both ask not what
the outcomes should be but how we should get there. But they are interested in different hows. The proceduralist
asks how the litigation process should work; the ethicist asks how the lawyer should conduct herself.")
(emphasis added); see also Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 2 at 308-09 (noting as a trend in the world of
process a "convergence of rules of procedure and rules of ethics").
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
10. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) Advisory Committee's note ("Subdivision (h) is new. Fee awards are a powerful
influence on the way attorneys initiate, develop, and conclude class actions .... Active judicial involvement in
measuring fee awards is singularly important to the proper operation of the class-action process.").
11. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp.,
109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)) ("The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor."); Court Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 253 (1985) (identifying one of the key questions to be answered in
connection with the development of standards and criteria utilized in determining court-awarded attorneys' fees
the question of whether lawyers can be "encouraged to work efficiently and pursue settlement at the earliest
opportunity and at the same time be compensated adequately to give them the incentives that lie at the heart of
the fund-in-court doctrine and statutory fee provisions").
12. BARBARA J. RoTHsTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLAss ACTION LITIGATION: A PocKET GUIDE
FOR JuDGEs 20 (3rd ed.) (2010) ("To align plaintiff counsel's interests with those of the class ... consider
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reform or via the development of case law that squarely addresses them.
Section IV considers why the trial courts resorted to using ethics doctrine to
justify their decisions allocating fees among layers of MDL counsel, locating
professional ethics within the broader MDL governance regime. That regime
includes: Congressional preferences expressed in federal legislation; 1 3 the
pronouncements, practices and norms of judicial institutions such as the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPMDL"),14 and federal trial and appellate
courts; and competing norms within the plaintiffs' bar. The MDL governance
regime is principally animated by a tension as to whether and to what extent
MDL administrative aggregation converts individual litigation into group
litigation warranting extraordinary court interventions. Professional rules and
norms have been invoked in fee-capping decisions by trial courts in part to
mediate this basic conflict, in the absence of greater and more direct resolution of
the basic procedural tension either by Congress or by trial courts. But, as
discussed in Section V, below, indirection comes at a price. To the extent they
depend on ethics doctrine designed for more limited application, the fee cap
orders do not fill the doctrinal gap in the MDL governance regime. Stated another
way, the ethics doctrine invoked in the trial courts' contingency fee cap orders
does not justify a more widely available basis for ensuring the proper allocation
and reasonableness of MDL attorneys' fees. Via statutory reform or case law, the
procedural questions MDL attorneys' fee orders implicate regarding the nature of
MDLs as an aggregation and case management device and the role of attorneys'
fees in facilitating its use must be confronted. Shaped by the answers to these
procedural questions, a test for the award and allocation of attorneys' fees among
layers of counsel involved in MDL proceedings should be clearly articulated and
consistently applied, to enhance the legitimacy of non-class aggregate settlements effectuated in MDLs.

linking the award of attorney fees to the value of the funds distributed to the class.
) available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClassGd3.pdf/$file/ClassGd3.pdf.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)-(e) defines the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the "JPMDL" or "Panel"),
including its core functions and procedures. Since the statute was enacted, the Panel has operated fairly
autonomously. See Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the JudicialPanelon MultidistrictLitigation's Selection
of Transferee Districtand Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 311, 315 (2009) [hereinafter Richards, JPML Selection
of District and Judge] ("Although the scope of the JPML's duties is narrow, it exercises broad discretion in the
execution of those duties."). There is no right of appeal from a decision of the Panel to deny a transfer and
coordination motion. Transfer and coordination orders are otherwise appealable only by extraordinary writ.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(e). See Richard L. Marcus, Cure-Allforan Era ofDispersed Litigation?Toward a Maxirnalist
Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel's Transfer Power, 82 Tut. L. REv. 2245, 2281 (2008) [hereinafter
Marcus, Toward a Maximalist Use] ("The makeup of the Panel creates a puzzle for review of its decisions; it
consists of seven circuit and district judges, no two from the same circuit. With this configuration, it would be
odd for review of the Panel's decisions to lie with a three-judge panel of a court of appeals. Instead, the [MDL]
statute attempts to insulate the actions of the Panel against any review.").
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II. PROCEDUREs ADOPTED IN RECENT MDLS AND THE DOCTRINAL
JUSTIFICATIONS UNDERLYING THEM

MDL transfer and coordination has traditionally been viewed as a more limited
form of aggregation than representative litigation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. MDL
plaintiffs formally retain a higher degree of autonomy: they choose their own
lawyers on terms they individually negotiate; they file, at least initially, in
jurisdictions of their choice; and they retain the right to have their cases
remanded back to the transferor jurisdiction for trial.1 5 However, over the past
two decades, as class treatment of mass torts involving personal injuries has been
used more sparingly, and as the systemic urge to aggregate has increasingly found
release in MDL practice,1 6 MDLs have developed features typical of class
actions: counsel are appointed by trial courts to perform common benefit work;17
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Heins & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40-41
(1998) (finding the language of § 1407 precludes a transferee court from utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to make
"self-assignments" and thereby retain transferred cases beyond pretrial proceedings).
16. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring)
("[S]ome observers believe there has been a shift in mass personal injury claims to aggregate non-class settlements .... This is significant, for outside the federal rules governing class actions, there is no prescribed
independent review of the structural and substantive fairness of a settlement including evaluation of attorneys'
fees, potential conflicts of interest, and counsel's allocation of settlement funds among class members."); see
also Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee, III, From Class Actions to MultidistrictConsolidations:Aggregate
Mass-Tort LitigationAfter Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REv. 775, 798 (2010) ("In recent years, the MDL process has
played an increasingly important role in the management and resolution of products-liability litigations.");
Margaret S. Williams, Richard A. Nagareda, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Kevin M. Scott & Emery G. Lee,
III The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation in Federal Civil Litigation: an Empirical Investigation 18
(Aug. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1443375 (using empirical data
to confirm and expand upon Professor Richard Marcus's observation that MDL practice is "maximalist," in that
it interprets the statutory authorization liberally); Marcus, Towarda Maximalist Use, supra note 14 (describing
genesis and growth of MDL practice); John G. Heyburn, II, A View from the Panel: Partof the Solution, 82 TUL.
L. REv. 2225, 2232 (2008) ("As the class action mechanism has evolved and, to some extent, become less
available or desirable, some litigants may be turning to the MDL processes as a way of achieving some of the
benefits or advantages formerly available under Rule 23.").
17. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LIIGAION §§ 10.22, 10.224, 22.62 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter MANUAL].
There is no precise definition of "common benefit work," though, as the phrase implies, it involves work done
for the common benefit of all MDL plaintiffs, rather than merely for the specific clients who retained a particular
lawyer. Common benefit work thus includes, for example, discovery on issues common to MDL plaintiffs
generally, as well as MDL-wide briefing, argument, and global settlement negotiations. See id. Common benefit
work excludes such individual-plaintiff-specific items as determining whether a particular plaintiff used a
defendant's product, or was injured by it; responding to discovery requests directed at individual plaintiffs; and
helping individual plaintiffs decide whether to accept and then pursue claims within the guidelines established
by global settlements. See id. Categories of common benefit work can be gleaned from the sections of the
MANUAL explaining how MDL counsel should be organized. See, e.g., id. at § 10.224 (defining the duties of
"lead" counsel in multiparty litigation). In specific MDL proceedings, common benefit work includes the work
done in performance of the responsibilities assigned to such counsel in the orders appointing them, and/or
in orders defining compensable common benefit work. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657,
Pretrial Order #6, at 2-8 (E.D. La. April 8, 2005) available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/
vioxxpto6withA.pdf (describing duties of Plaintiffs' Steering Committee as including, by way of example,
conducting "discovery on behalf of plaintiffs in all actions which are consolidated with the instant multidistrict
litigation," acting as "spokesperson for all plaintiffs at pretrial proceedings and in response to any inquiries by
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highly managerial judges closely supervise the litigation; and MDL often leads to
aggregate settlements that resolve categories of litigation whole-cloth. Practice
has outpaced the development of doctrine supporting these dramatic developments. Nowhere is this more visible than in judicial treatment of attorneys' fees,18
both for court-appointed counsel and for attorneys hired directly by plaintiffs.19
A. PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE OF RECENT MDLS
The Vioxx, Guidant and Zyprexa matters followed similar procedural trajectories. In each matter, news that a drug or medical device caused personal injuries

prompted widespread filings of lawsuits in state and federal courts by plaintiffs
who hired lawyers pursuant to contingency fee agreements. 2 0 The JPMDL
transferred related cases pending in the federal system to a single federal judge
for pretrial purposes.2 1 In each case, the MDL trial court appointed a subset of
the Court, subject of course to the right of any plaintiff's counsel to present non-repetitive individual or different
positions," and establishing time and expense reporting requirements for "all activities performed and expenses
incurred by counsel that relate to matters common to all claimants in MDL 1657").
18. Practice has outpaced doctrine in that there is no clear statutory basis for some of the practices pertaining
to the treatment of attorneys' fees, and there has been little if any appellate court vetting of their doctrinal
footings. The underdevelopment of doctrine pertaining to MDL practice was noticeable by the 1990s. See, e.g.,
Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, supra note 2, at 355 ("[I]t is a fourth context, the mass tort, that makes plain the
inadequacy of the law developed to date. Current rules fail to address the problems of aggregate mass torts, with
their layers of lawyers. Who should get paid in these litigations, and for what? ... How much of a role (if any)
should clients play in making decisions about paying 'their' lawyers?"); Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis,
Contingent Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk and the ProvisionofLegal Services when Layers ofLawyers Work
for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAuL L. REV. 425, 432 (1998) [hereinafter Resnik & Curtis,
Contingent Fees in Mass Torts] ("While the existence of two sets of attorneys in mass torts has become
well-known over the past decade, little by way of rules or case law guides courts in sorting out the relationships
among clients and the many lawyers within mass tort group litigation."). See also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (Kaplan, J., concurring) (noting that the question of whether a district
court may order that a percentage of settlement monies paid in pending MDL cases be set aside to fund possible
fee awards to court-appointed common benefit counsel "arises frequently in MDLs" but "has not been addressed
by any circuit" and is thus "novel"). The persistence of this doctrinal immaturity is explained, at least in part, in
Section IV, infra, which identifies a basic unresolved tension within the MDL governance regime. The question
of the treatment of MDL attorneys' fees is one aspect of an emerging set of issues pertaining to the scope of the
MDL transferee judges' power. See Richard L. Marcus, Edward F. Sherman & Howard M. Erichson, COMPLEX
LMGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 160-172 (5th ed. 2010) (outlining the

broader questions relating to MDL transferee judges' powers).
19. Individual plaintiffs typically retain their own counsel pursuant to a contingency fee agreement under
which the lawyer advances costs and labor, at no charge to the client, unless the lawyer's efforts result in a
recovery for the client, from which costs and the negotiated contingent fee may be deducted.
20. Id. at 551 (describing a wave of filing of individual suits after September 20, 2004, when Merck
withdrew Vioxx from the market); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (noting the filing and subsequent
transfer and coordination of individual actions for "injuries alleged to have been caused by certain defective
implantable defibrillator devices and pacemakers manufactured by Guidant"); Zyprexa, 594 F.3d at 119
(Kaplan, J., concurring) (noting filing of tens of thousands of cases by individuals who were prescribed and took
Zyprexa and claimed that they consequently suffered injuries).
21. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (conferring multidistrict
litigation status); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1371
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counsel to leadership positions.22 In Vioxx and Guidant, courts assessed MDL
plaintiffs to create a source of funds to compensate court-appointed counsel
for conmon benefit work, a standard practice in MDL litigation.23 In each
coordinated proceeding, the parties engaged in both common motion practice
and discovery as well as individual, plaintiff-specific discovery.2 4 In addition,
(J.P.M.L. 2005) (centralizing actions sharing allegations of defects in certain implantable defibrillator devices
and pacemakers manufactured by the defendants); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1380
(J.P.M.L. 2004) (consolidating tens of thousands of suits).
22. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (E.D. La. 2009) ("[T]he Court appointed
committees of counsel to represent the parties and to meet with the Court once every month to review the status
of the litigation"); Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *1 (recounting procedural history, including appointment of
Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel Committee and Plaintiffs' Steering Committee); Zyprexa, 594 F.3d at 116 ("A group of
lawyers was established as the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee to help prosecute the cases in the MDL court. That
litigation was settled in late 2005.") (citation omitted.). In early 2006, the trial court provided that the costs and
fees of the PSC would be paid out of the general settlement fund to the extent approved by the special masters
and pursuant to a one percent set aside in an escrow fund of the gross settlement amount payable to each settling
plaintiff. "A second Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (the 'PSC II') was then established to help prosecute the
many new Zyprexa cases that had been filed . . .. In an order dated March 28, 2006, the district court
established" fee restrictions, including the contingency fee caps mentioned above. "In an order dated
December 5, 2006, the district court granted in part a motion by PSC H to establish a common benefit fund to
compensate PSC H attorneys for their 'significant discovery work.' The court ordered a set-aside equal to three
percent ofjudgments and settlements in favor of the plaintiffs in any of the cases in the MDL court . . . .").
23. See MANUAL §§ 14.215, 20.312 (2004); see also In re Oil Spill, MDL No. 2179, December 28, 2011
Order and Reasons as to the Motion to Establish Account and Reserve for Litigation Expenses (Rec. Doc. 4507),
availableat http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/122820110rder(ReserveAccount).pdf (ordering defendants to hold back 6% of gross payments to plaintiffs to create a reserve for later payments to compensate
and reimburse common benefit counsel, and ordering, further: "Specifically, this hold back requirement applies
to all actions filed in or removed to federal court that have been or become a part of the MDL, whether or not a
motion to remand has been filed, claimants who settle directly with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, or state court
plaintiffs represented by counsel who have participated in or had access to the discovery conducted in this
MDL. Exempt from this hold back requirement are state court counsel who have or had no cases in this MDL
and who have never had access to any of the discovery undertaken in the MDL."); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 1657, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/
o&rl01910.pdf (describing PTO 19, dated August 4, 2005, which established "a Plaintiffs' Litigation Expense
Fund, to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed and expenses incurred for the common
benefit. Pursuant to this Order, any case that was settled, compromised, dismissed, or otherwise reduced to
judgment for monetary relief, with or without trial, was subject to an assessment. In order to avail themselves of
the initial work of the common benefit attorneys, individual plaintiffs' counsel could, for a limited time, enter
into a contract that was to dictate the assessment amount. The 'Full Participation Option,' which was one such
option, established an assessment of 2% of the recovery for fees and 1% of the recovery for costs." After the
expiration of that limited time period, counsel could "accept a 'Traditional Assessment Option' providing for
6% assessment of recoveries in MDL cases and 4% assessment of recoveries in state court cases"); Guidant,
2008 WL 682174, at *1-2 (describing "PTO" (pretrial order) No. 6, in which the trial court established a
common benefit fund and "set forth protocols to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed
and expenses incurred for MDL administration or otherwise for Plaintiffs' general benefit," including a four
percent fee and cost "assessment" on plaintiffs' gross monetary recoveries); Zyprexa, 594 F3d at 119-120
(Kaplan, J., concurring) (describing set aside orders, attendant to a first-wave aggregate settlement, and
subsequently to create a fund for possible compensation of PSC II attorneys who were still working to prosecute
cases after the original settlement).
24. See, e.g., Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at *5 (E.D. La 2009),
available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/o&rl01910.pdf ("Discovery rapidly commenced. The common benefit attorneys were responsible for all aspects of pre-trial preparation, including document discovery,
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bellwether trials 25 of a representative sampling of cases were contemplated and,
in some instances, conducted.26 At the same time, the trial court in each case
actively encouraged settlement discussions, 27 which produced aggregate settlements on a non-class basis. The courts thus achieved preclusion through the
release provisions of contracts, rather than via certification of a plaintiff class and
entry of a class judgment under Rule 23.
As framed and implemented, the settlements shared key features: They were

aggregate, in that in each settlement defendants agreed to pay a lump sum,
conditioned upon minimum participation rates.28 Vioxx and Guidant involved

the taking of depositions, preparation of experts, motions practice, and to some extent, coordination of federal
and state court proceedings. Millions of documents were discovered and collated. Thousands of depositions
were taken and at least 1,000 discovery motions were argued."); Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *2-3
(summarizing court structuring of common and individual discovery through pretrial orders); In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that discovery was overseen by the
court-appointed discovery master).
25. A bellwether trial is an individual (non-class) representative (typical) trial, normally generating a final
judgment that is preclusive only with regard to the parties in the individual case, and, in addition, of
informational value to parties involved in mass tort litigation for purposes of testing claims or defenses, or
assigning value to categories of claims or defenses. See, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard
Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2323, 2332 (2008) [hereinafter Fallon,
Grabill & Wynne] (describing history and modem informational use of bellwether trials in MDL litigation).
26. See Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (describing six MDL bellwether trials, as well as thirteen additional
Vioxx-related cases tried before juries in state courts, preceding the most significant global settlement
discussions); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB),
2008 WL 682174, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (discussing scheduling of bellwether trials).
27. See Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (noting encouragement of "several coordinated courts" to promote
settlement discussions); Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *3 (discussing court's involvement in ultimately
successful settlement discussions through Magistrate Judge Boylan and Special Master Pat Juneau); Zyprexa,
424 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (noting involvement of court-appointed special settlement masters).
28. See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., & Counsel at 41-43, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 1657, 650 F Supp. 2d 549, 551-52 (E.D. La. 2009), available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.
com/documents/Master%20Settlement%2OAgreement%20-%20new.pdf (describing Merck's "walk away rights"
in the event enrollment in the settlement fails to meet specified minimum thresholds); Memorandum from
Levin, Fishbein, Sedrin & Berman, Counsel to Plaintiffs, to All Vioxx Clients (2008), http://www.1fsblaw.com/
wp-content/themes/1fsblaw/inc/MEMO-TO-CLIENTS-FOR-WEBSITE.pdf ("Please note, however, that Merck
has the option not to fund the Settlement Program and to terminate the Settlement Program if a minimum
number of potentially eligible Claimants nationwide does not agree to participate."); Order Amending the
March 3, 2010 and June 16, 2010 Orders Amending the Distribution of Funds for No. 05-1708 (D. Minn.
August 23, 2010), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/MDL-Guidant/PretrialMinutes/2010/100823ord2005md
1708.pdf ("On December 1, 2008, Plaintiffs provided Guidant with settlement documents for 95% of the
eligible settlement participants. Upon 95% participation, the Guidant MDL settlement was guaranteed to go
forward. After reaching this participation threshold, the parties agreed that the vast majority of claimants'
obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) had been met and further agreed that these
claimants were eligible for payment. Accordingly, on December 19, 2008, the Court ordered a partial
distribution of settlement funds so as to provide payment eligible claimants with access to a portion of their
allocated settlement funds."); Eli Lilly Co., Quarterly Report (FormlO-Q) at 4 (Nov. 3, 2005) (making
defendant's funding obligations contingent on acceptance of the settlement terms by 90 percent of Zyprexa
plaintiffs); see also Howard M. Erichson, A Typology ofAggregate Settlements, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1769
(2004) (defining and characterizing "aggregate" settlements as having qualities among multiple dimensions,
including collective allocation and conditionality); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent
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enhanced payments to counsel 29 who performed common benefit work. This
meant that the very counsel who negotiated the global settlements negotiated
provisions enabling them to seek from the court an award of fees greater than
provided in pre-settlement orders.3 0 Finally, in each case, the trial court capped
fees that could be collected by individually-retained counsel. The contingency
fee caps were imposed across-the-board; they applied to all claims (or claims that
settled for particular amounts), though individually-retained counsel had the
option of seeking a limited adjustment of the contingency fee cap.
These contingency fee caps were the flip side of payment of enhanced fees to
common benefit counsel, itself a vehicle for facilitating the management and
global resolution of MDLs. This is not a particularly controversial statement; the
fee cap orders in Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa explicitly linked the "reasonableness" of contingency fees charged by individually-retained counsel to the
attorneys' fee amounts allocatable to common benefit counsel.3 2 Judge Frank was

Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 265, 265 (2011) (critically examining the structure of the Vioxx settlement,
which was between the defendant and law firms iepresenting individuals suing the defendant).
29. The fees paid to court-appointed common benefit counsel were "enhanced" in two respects. First, such
fees were paid in addition to fees collected by such counsel from the clients who individually-retained them
pursuant to contingency fee agreements. Second, in Vioxx and Guidant, fees paid to court-appointed common
benefit counsel were enhanced in that the pool from which such fees could be paid was enlarged as part of the
global settlements reached in those cases. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-ClassAction
Method ofManagingMulti-DistrictLitigations: Problemsand a Proposal,63 VAND. L. REv. 107, 132-33 (2010)
[hereinafter Silver & Miller] (describing how Vioxx and Guidant MDL global settlements resulted in enlarged
pools from which court-appointed common benefit or "lead" lawyers were ultimately paid).
30. See id.at 131-32 ("'Seeking a firmer foundation for fee awards in MDLs, some judges required limited
lawyers to sign fee transfer agreements,' which specified low percentage pre-global-settlement set asides to pay
common benefit fees and costs, as did Judges Fallon and Frank in Vioxx and Guidant. 'In practice, however, a
different problem emerged: the lead attorneys wanted more money than the agreements entitled them to collect.
To get around the agreements, which the MDL judges promulgated at their request, the lead attorneys might
have sought orders increasing the amounts set aside for common benefit compensation. But this direct approach
had an obvious downside: it would have deprived the fee set-aside of its consensual gloss. Hoping to preserve
the impression that moneys were being withheld by agreement, the lead attorneys devised a different strategy.
They wrote provisions into the global settlement agreements increasing the set-asides, and they required
disabled lawyers and their clients to waive objections to these provisions as a condition for enrolling in the
settlements."').
31. See Voxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 565 ("[In the rare case where an individual attorney believes a departure
from this cap is warranted, he shall be entitled to submit evidence to the Court for consideration."); Guidant,
2008 WL 682174, at * 19 ("Parties may petition the Special Masters to have the 20% increased upward to a
maximum of either 33.33%, the percentage previously agreed to in the individual cases contingent fee
arrangement between the attorney and the client, or the limit imposed by state law, whichever of the three is
less."); Guidant,2008 WL 3896006 at *10 (raising fee caps); Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 ("[T]he special
masters will have the power to vary fee caps ... on the basis of special circumstances.").
32. In Vioxx, Judge Fallon noted that contingency fee caps and the award of fees to common benefit counsel
were intertwined. See Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 556 n.9 ("It should be pointed out that addressing the issue of
attorneys' fees in the context of the Vioxx global settlement will require a two-step process. The first step
involves examining the reasonableness of all the contingent fee contracts in the global settlement and setting an
appropriate limitation on the amount of fees that attorneys may charge claimants. The second step of the process
will involve allocating a percentage of those fees for the Common Benefit Fund to be distributed to those who
provided services that benefitted all claimants and their attorneys."). In Guidant, Judge Frank addressed
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perhaps the most explicit in terms of justifying the contingency fee caps by
reference to the amounts he allocated for purposes of paying common benefit
fees, a number he treated as fixed when comparing outcomes while varying caps
on contingency fees that could be charged by individually-retained counsel.
Justifying the 20% contingency fee cap he imposed, Judge Frank wrote:
The Court finds that anything more than 20% would result in excessive fees
based on the unique contours of this case. For example, setting aside 10% of
the $240,000,000.00 for costs, 15% of the remaining $230,000,000.00 for the
Common Benefit Attorney Fee Fund, and allowing 30% across the board for
attorney fees, results in 38.81% of the total Settlement Fund going strictly
toward attorney fees. Setting aside 10% of the $240,000,000.00 for costs, 15%
of the remaining $230,000,000.00 for the Common Benefit Attorney Fee
Fund, and allowing 25% across the board for attorney fees, results in 34.73% of
the total Settlement Fund going strictly toward attorney fees. Both of these
scenarios result in a total attorney-fee award that is too high. Instead, setting
aside 10% of the $240,000,000.00 for costs, 15% of the remaining
$230,000,000.00 for the Common Benefit Attorney Fee Fund, and allowing
20% across the board for attorney fees, results in 33.67% of the total Settlement
Fund going strictly toward attorney fees, which the Court finds reasonable
under the circumstances.33
A primary driver of the 20% cap on contingency fees that could be charged by
individually-retained counsel in Guidant was thus the overall amount MDL
plaintiffs would have to pay in attorneys' fees in light of the enhanced fees
allocated to common benefit counsel. Comparing the fee caps in Vioxx and
Guidantmakes the same point: Why were individually-retained counsel in Woxx
able to charge higher contingency fees (under a universal fee cap of 32%,
including the 6.5% allocated for common benefit fees) than were the individuallyretained counsel in Guidant, who initially faced a 20% cap? In Vioxx, a case with
a larger settlement pot, court-appointed common benefit counsel sought only
6.5% of the fund as a source of compensation for common benefit work, whereas
in Guidant, a much larger share of a smaller settlement fund, 15%, was set aside

enhanced payments to common benefit counsel and contingency fee caps for individually-retained counsel in
the same decision. See Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *1. Judge Frank first ruled on the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee's Request Pursuant to Section I.K of the Master Settlement Agreement for a Determination of the
Common Benefit Attorney Fee Amount. Id., at *4-17. Judge Frank then turned to the issue of contingency fee
caps. Id., at *17-19. He justified a 20% cap on contingency fees chargeable by individually-retained counsel in
light of the fact that any higher fee percentages would cause MDL plaintiffs to pay too much in attorneys' fee
overall, in light of and taking as a given, the 15% Common Benefit Attorney Fee Fund. Id. at *19 n.30.
Similarly, in Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein tethered contingency fee caps to common benefit work and fees.
Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 490 ("[L]imiting fees is particularly appropriate in the instant litigation since much
of the discovery work the attorneys would normally have done on a retail basis in individual cases has been done
at a reduced cost on a wholesale basis by the plaintiffs' steering committee.").
33. Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *19 n.30. As noted, the Court subsequently adjusted the fee formula,
raising the cap, without changing the underlying dynamics the original fee cap order reflects. See supra note 5.
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for possible payments to common benefit counsel.3 4 The fee capping decisions do
not suggest that individually-retained counsel did less work in one case or the
other, or that the scale economy advantage from MDL aggregation was greater in
one case or the other. Instead, in each case, the enhanced fee award to common
benefit counsel drove the cap on contingency fees individually-retained counsel
could collect. The importance of these observations cannot be overemphasized:
Enhanced fees were awarded to MDL common benefit counsel to facilitate
aggregation by providing what amounts to an incentive payment for successfully
resolving MDL proceedings via contractual aggregation, and these incentive
awards, analogous to the attomeys'-fee-as-bounty3 5 awarded at the end of
successfully-resolved class actions, drove the fee caps on individually retained
counsel.
These moves-non-class aggregate settlements, involving enhanced fee
set-asides for common benefit counsel and related caps on individually-retained
counsel's contingency fees-placed two procedural issues front and center: the
allocation of fees between court-appointed common benefit counsel and MDL
plaintiffs' individually-retained attorneys, and the role of the court with respect to
awarding fees to either group of counsel, issues as to which, as noted, the MDL
statute is silent. The trial court in each case provided a detailed justification for its
fee orders, which the next section of this Article assesses.
B. DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINGENCY FEE CAPS IN
RECENT MDLS
The MDL courts' fee-capping orders contain virtually identical doctrinal
arguments in support of the caps, grounded in procedural analogies to class
actions, the text of the MDL statute, the terms of the global settlement agreements, and ethics doctrine.

34. See supra notes 4-5.
35. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "PrivateAttorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L.
REv. 2129, 2136 (2004) (noting the conventional distinction between private and public attorneys general based
on their incentives); see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuring the PrivateAtttorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 235-36 (1983) (characterizing the class action
lawyer as a "bounty hunter").
36. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to interfere with contingency fee agreements negotiated by
legally competent persons, absent a concern regarding abuse-typically defined as "unreasonable" or
"excessive" fees. See, e.g., Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1982) (A contingency fee
"agreement between two freely consenting, competent adults will most often be controlling. . . .").
37. The fee capping orders canvassed in this Article were entered in MDLs in which non-class aggregate
settlements were reached. The doctrinal arguments they marshaled appear to have traction outside this setting.
Judge Carl J. Barbier, in In re Oil Spill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83214 (E.D. La. 2012), faced with class action
settlements effectuated through that MDL proceeding, cited and relied on Judge Fallon's fee capping order in
Vioxx. MDL No. 1657 at *5 (imposing a 25% contingency fee cap on individually-retained counsel, and noting
that "the Court agrees with, relies upon, and incorporates by reference the reasons set forth by Judge Fallon" in
Vioxx).
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1. PROCEDURAL, STATUTORY, AND CONTRACTUAL JUSTIFICATIONS

The trial courts' orders characterized the MDL proceedings as "quasi-class
actions," in part because the matters involved numerous plaintiffs, and were
litigated and resolved on a group basis with substantial MDL trial court
involvement.38 On that ground, the courts invoked principles governing the
regulation of attorneys' fees in class actions. These class action principles
included the common benefit/common fund doctrine, which is rooted in
restitutionary principles. As has been forcefully argued elsewhere, key structural
features of class actions that implicate the common fund doctrine (e.g.,
enrichment,3 9 implied consent40 ) are arguably missing in the MDL setting; the
restitutionary principles that justify court control over fees in class actions thus
do not easily fit in the MDL context.4 1 Moreover, formally, there is no such
procedural creature as a "quasi-class action." The Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that it intends to police the line, at least for purposes of
non-party preclusion, between class actions certified under Rule 23, and other
actions that involve merely "virtual" representation.4 2 Accordingly, it is not
38. Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (characterizing the Vioxx global settlement as a quasi-class action,
thus giving the court equitable authority to review contingency fee agreements for reasonableness); Guidant,
2008 WL 682174, at *18 (labeling the proceeding as a quasi-class action, implicating the court's equitable
authority to impose caps on contingency fees); Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (The order capping fees of
individually-retained counsel was part of the court's exercise of "its power to control legal fees in a coordinated
litigation of many individual related cases-in effect, a quasi-class action."). See also Jeremy Hays, The
Quasi-ClassAction Model for Limiting Attorneys'Fees in MultidistrictLitigation,67 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L.
589 (2012) (tracing history and context of use of "quasi-class action" model in MDLs).
39. As Professors Silver and Miller have argued, at least some MDL plaintiffs can be said to be worse off due
to MDL aggregation, rather than enriched, because they are deprived of their choice of counsel on claims that
are individually worth litigating (unlike many class actions, where the claims are not individually economically
viable), and because the MDL plaintiffs' counsel are effectively declawed as a result of being unable to
effectively threaten an aggregate trial. See Silver & Miller, supra note 29, at 122-24. See also William B.
Rubenstein, On What a "Common Benefit Fee" Is, Is Not, and Should Be, 3 CLASS ACTION Arr'Y FEE DIG. 87,

87-88 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter Rubenstein] ("The one thing a common benefit fee is not is a class action fee
award," in part because, unlike, say, the small claims class action, the individual cases that comprise an MDL
are individually economically viable).
40. MDL plaintiffs need not consent either to aggregation, or to participation in the MDL, or to the
appointment of counsel performing common benefit work, or to the choices such counsel make. Class plaintiffs'
consent, conversely, is implied, at least in cases involving money damages that are certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
by the opt-out right afforded to them. See Silver & Miller, supra note 29, at 124.
41. See Silver & Miller, supra note 29, at 121-30 (questioning the application of unjust enrichment doctrine
to authorize fee awards to lead lawyers in MDLs). But see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113,
128-30 (2d Cir. 2010) (Kaplan, J., concurring) (grounding authority to compensate court-appointed common
benefit counsel in the common benefit doctrine).
42. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (disapproving of the doctrine of preclusion by "virtual
representation"); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate Litigation,
87 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming April 2012) (manuscript at 30) (cited with approval from the author) ("One
message Taylor should send is the danger presented by analogies to the class action to justify procedural steps in
a litigation that does not involve a certified class. Special red flags appear to go up in the view of the Court when
arguments from the world of the class action are harnessed to do work outside the defined contours of that
device.").

72

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICs

[Vol. 26:59

surprising that the MDL trial courts went beyond the class analogy in search of a
doctrinal hook for regulating fees that are typically the subject of private contract.
The MDL statute itself provided a second major basis of the contingency
fee cap orders. In Vioxx, for example, Judge Fallon found that the MDL statute
implicitly authorized an inquiry into the reasonableness of fees:
Admittedly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that district
courts may require reasonable fees in class actions while the MDL statute lacks
an analogous provision. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii) and Fed. R.
Civ. P.23(h), with 28 U.S.C. § 1407. This statutory difference, however, is not
the end of the story. First, the MDL statute requires that transferee courts
"promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
In the context of contingent fee arrangements, implementing a reasonable cap
promotes justice for all parties by allowing claimants to benefit (as their
attorneys have) from the economies of scale and increased efficiency that an
MDL provides. Certainly, this statutory language lends support to the
proposition that MDL courts, like class action courts, can exercise equitable
authority to examine the reasonableness of fees.43
As an attempt to articulate doctrine, Judge Fallon's statutory argument heads in
the right direction, grounding court supervision of fees in the procedural statute
itself. Judge Fallon's argument also implies a formula for calculating courtappointed counsel compensation and fee caps by quantifying the efficiency gain
from MDL coordination. But the implied statutory authority argument with
regard to court intervention on fees suffers from a number of weaknesses, both in
formulation and application: As currently framed, it does not explain why the
MDL statute's stated goal of "just and efficient" pretrial management requires
intervention in privately-negotiated fee contracts. The word "just" in the MDL
statute may be sufficiently elastic to imply that plaintiffs should enjoy some or all
of the scale economy advantage that MDL litigation produces for their attorneys;
but the leap from just pretrial management to re-allocation of attorneys' fees is
arguably a big one. It involves clearing the hurdle of a powerful tradition of
honoring privately negotiated attorney fee contracts, discussed below. These,
though, are more matters of justification and articulation of doctrine, than of
power. The real problem with the statutory argument is in the application of it.
Specifically, it is not at all clear that any one of the MDL courts in Vioxx, Guidant,
or Zyprexa actually used the formula in Judge Fallon's procedural argument.
When imposing fee caps the courts imposed across-the-board fee caps. These
caps impacted different MDL plaintiffs differently, not depending on the scale
economy advantage each plaintiff enjoyed, but, rather, depending merely on the
original contingency fee agreement. Plaintiffs who agreed to pay more at the
outset benefited more from the caps, even if they did not necessarily benefit any

43. Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
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more from common benefit work than did those plaintiffs whose original
contingency fee agreements were closer to the cap."
A third major grounding of the court's intervention in private fee agreements
was the text of the global settlement agreements,4 5 which, according to the trial
courts in Vioxx and Guidant at least, expressly authorized the courts to regulate
fees.46 Some of the individually-retained plaintiffs' attorneys expressed surprise
that the global settlement agreement terms vested the trial courts with the
authority to impose contingency fee caps. 47 It is safe to assume at this point that
lawyers involved in mass torts are on notice of this issue. It will be interesting to
see whether such awareness limits the ability of court-appointed common benefit
counsel to negotiate global agreement terms that both render individuallyretained counsel's fees vulnerable to caps, and prompt widespread participation
in MDL aggregate settlements.
2. THE COURTS' INHERENT AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE MEMBERS OF THE
BAR TO ENFORCE ETHICs RULES
The focus of this Article is the final doctrinal justification asserted by the MDL
trial courts in support of contingency fee caps. This justification transcends the
terms of the global settlement agreements in those cases. In each case, the trial
court asserted its inherent authority to regulate members of the bar to enforce
ethics norms.

44. As discussed below, it is this squarely procedural foundation for judicial intervention in MDL fees that
must be developed, strengthened (via statutory amendment to clarify the role of fees in achieving MDL
procedural goals, or via case law more clearly grounding fees in the inherent authority of courts to manage
proceedings, rather than to enforce ethical norms), and, most importantly, actually applied to determine fee
awards and allocations.
45. See Jeremy T. Grabill, JudicialReview of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 123,
124 (2012) ("A private mass tort settlement begins as a contractual agreement between plaintiffs' liaison
counsel and the defendant(s) involved in a particular mass tort litigation that sets forth a negotiated settlement
offer for each individual to consider. The substance of the settlement offer consists of a commitment by the
defendant(s) to pay a fixed amount to the current aggregate plaintiff population, with individual awards varying
based on the strength of each plaintiff's claim as determined by the allocation of 'points' among the plaintiffs by
a neutral administrator pursuant to negotiated-and often very complex-formulas and grids.. .. Once
negotiated by liaison counsel, the master settlement offer is then presented to individual plaintiffs for
consideration and often made available for inspection by the general public as well. Each individual plaintiff
may either affirmatively opt in to the claims process (i.e., accept the settlement offer) and voluntarily dismiss his
or her lawsuit, or reject the settlement offer and continue litigating.").
46. See Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 561-62 ("The Vioxx Settlement Agreement is replete with examples of the
parties' desire to grant authority to this Court" to adjust fees.); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174 at *4 (D. Minn. 2008) ("The MSA
included a provision, section II.K., stating that the Court would determine the amount of the Common Benefit
Payment.").
47. See, e.g., Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (Certain plaintiffs' counsel opposed to the contingency fee caps
asserted that no provision of the settlement agreement purports to regulate the fee contracts at issue, and
that, moreover, the agreement "expressly divests this Court of the authority to act," contentions rejected by
Judge Fallon).
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In Zyprexa, the first and most ground-breaking of the three MDLs canvassed
herein, Judge Weinstein noted that the "judiciary has well-established authority
to exercise ethical supervision of the bar in both individual and mass actions."4 8
This authority includes "the power to review contingency fee contracts for
fairness." 4 9 He further held that the court's ability to supervise fees "includes
the power to determine the fee contract was not obtained through undue influence
or fraud and that the amount of the fee is not unfair or excessive under the
circumstances of the case."so Calling the project of reviewing individually
negotiated fees "distasteful and unappetizing," 5 t Judge Weinstein nevertheless
undertook it because the circumstances of the Zyprexa MDL purportedly
warranted it: The contingency fees were deemed potentially excessive as a
consequence of MDL administrative aggregation itself, which involved the
appointment of particular counsel to perform common benefit work. Such
counsel's labor generated economies of scale thereby reducing litigation costs of
individually-retained counsel who would otherwise have been forced to reproduce the same common work in each separately-filed case. Failure to pass the
savings gained from aggregation on to MDL settlement participants risked
tarnishing the public's perception of the profession in general and of MDL
litigation in particular.52
The trial courts in Guidantand Vioxx made substantially identical arguments,
referring to the same principles and doctrine. The cases also cited each other as
additional support for these propositions. In Guidant, Judge Frank held: "this
Court has the inherent right and responsibility to supervise the members of its bar
in both individual and mass actions, including the right to review contingency fee
contracts for fairness," citing some of the same ethics cases prohibiting excessive
and unreasonable fees on which Judge Weinstein relied in Zyprexa." Bringing

48. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Lit, 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Ex ParteBur, 22 U.S
529, 530 (1824) (quotation omitted)).
49. Id. (citing Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 45-46, 3 S. Ct. 441, 443-44 (1844) (using "clearly excessive"
standard)).
50. Id. (citing Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1982)).
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id. ("The total settlement amount held in escrow is large, and the over 8,000 plaintiffs involved in the
settlement are represented by only a handful of firms, all of whom can be expected to gain substantial fees from
their numerous clients' combined recoveries. Yet these firms all benefitted from the effectiveness of coordinated
discovery carried out in conjunction with the plaintiffs' steering committee and from other economies of scale,
suggesting a need for reconsideration of fee arrangements that may have been fair when the individual
litigations were commenced."); Id. at 493-94 ("The risk of excessive fees is a matter of special concern here
because of the mass nature of the case. As the FarmingtonDowel court recognized, excessive fees can create a
sense of overcompensation and reflect poorly on the court and its bar. Farmington Dowel, 421 F.2d at 90 n.62.
See also Rosquist, 692 F.2d at 1111 ('Courts have a stake in attorney's fee contracts; the fairness of the terms
reflects directly on the court and its bar.').").
53. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 WL 682174, at *18 (citing,
among other authorities, the Rosquist, Farmington Dowel, and Taylor decisions on which Judge Weinstein
relied in the Zyprexa fee capping order).
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that body of doctrine. to bear on the case before him, Judge Frank found that
plaintiffs' counsel were conflicted with regard to the fee issue (because they were
not motivated to contest their own fees), that excessive fee awards in the MDL
would risk being viewed as "abusive" by the public, and that the plaintiffs
themselves were "both physically ill and aging," all of which together suggested
that only the court could "effectively exercise the ethical control of fees and
properly monitor fee division to protect all Plaintiffs' interests."54
Similarly, in Vioxx, Judge Fallon, citing Judge Frank in Guidant and Judge
Weinstein in Zyprexa, among other authorities, noted "Courts that have
considered the issue have nearly unanimously concluded that the power to
consider the reasonableness of contingent fees is inherent in a federal court."
He married that authority to the court's power to "prevent a violation of the
lawyers' professional responsibility to charge only reasonable rates . ... 56 As
particular justification for the exercise of this authority in the Vioxx MDL
litigation, Judge Fallon found an inherent conflict of interest between the
claimants and their lawyers on the issue of fee caps, since both seek to maximize
their respective percentage take of any award; that outsized contingency fees
would "damage the public's faith in the judicial process"; and that the claimants
were "vulnerable," because they were generally elderly and claimed personal
injuries from use of a drug."
There is no question that trial courts have long claimed inherent authority to
supervise members of the bar, and specifically to supervise attorneys' fees for
reasonableness. Contingency fee contracts are treated differently than the
contracts of laypersons, and even of other professionals, because lawyers are
subject to special controls, including the disciplinary powers of courts and the

54. Id.
55. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F Supp. 2d 549, 559-60 (citing the Guidantand Zyprexa fee capping
orders, as well as Hoffert v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)).
56. Id. at 560.
57. Id. at 560-61.
58. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43, 48 (1991) (recognizing flexibility of the inherent powers
doctrine); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, ApportioningDue Process: Preservingthe Right to Affordable Justice,
87 DENV. U. L. REv. 437, 455 (2010) ("Courts, in both class actions and non-class action mass torts cases, have
long considered it a function of their inherent authority and case management jurisdiction to keep track of
lawyers' time and costs, on an ongoing basis, and to set limits, not only on court-awarded class counsel fees, but
on private contingency fees as well. This trend has recently accelerated."); Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility
of Rules: RegulatingAttorney Conduct in FederalCourt Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 8 (2005) [hereinafter
McMorrow] ("Federal courts have the inherent power to control the proceedings in their courtroom, including
the long-recognized (albeit conceptually unclear) inherent power to regulate attorneys."); Resnik, Curtis, &
Hensler, supra note 2, at 336 ("Courts have power over fees either because Congress has said so (in the context
of requiring defendants to pay attorneys' fees of prevailing plaintiffs, in the bankruptcy arena, and in other
statutory litigation schemes) or because courts have found their own authority."). But see generally Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal CourtAuthority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory,
56 VAND. L. REv. 1303 (2003) (questioning the conceptual basis of the federal court's inherent authority to
regulate attorneys).
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ethical prescriptions formulated by bar associations.5 9 Courts' power to supervise
attorneys' fees for reasonableness is traditionally located in the courts' power
to "regulate the practice of law." 6 0 This authority is so widely recognized that
many of the attorneys subjected to fee caps in Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa did
not even bother to challenge its existence. 6 ' The more difficult question, then,
with regard to these cases, is whether the courts' authority was properly bounded
and exercised.

III. MDL TRIAL COURTS HAVE PUSHED THE BOUNDARIES OF THEIR
"INHERENT AUTHORITY" TO POLICE FOR EXCESSIVE FEES

The Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa fee capping orders cite a number of cases
containing broad language about the authority of trial courts to supervise counsel.
But those cases involve an application of that authority that is distinct from, and
narrower than, what the courts have done in these MDL cases. In general, the
cases cited in the MDL courts' fee capping orders involved highly-contextualized
and case-specific court supervision of attorneys' fees, where the plaintiffs were
legally incompetent (e.g., minors), or where court intervention in fee issues was
attendant to either the award of statutory fees (e.g., under federal antitrust law), or
to the creation of a common fund as part of a class action settlement. A different
type of inherent authority-not to police counsel's adherence to ethics norms,
but, instead-to ensure the proper conduct of litigation, may properly ground
court interventions to ensure payment to common benefit counsel. However, its
parameters in the MDL setting are not yet known, because the procedural
questions at stake with regard to MDL fees have not been definitively asked or
answered.

59. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Law ofLawyers' Contractsis Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 443, 445 (1998)
("When lawyers appear before the courts as litigants, special rules laid down for lawyers in contract cases can be
viewed as extensions of the courts' powers to regulate the conduct of members of the bar. Similarly, the courts'
application, in contract decisions, of disciplinary standards of conduct, can be seen as further extensions of the
power of the organized profession to guide or discipline the conduct of individual lawyers.").
60. See, e.g., Gardner v. N.C. St. Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 287-88 (1986) ("While we agree with the statement in
McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 485, 91 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1956), that 'questions of propriety and ethics are
ordinarily for the consideration of the... Bar' because that organization was expressly created by the
legislature to deal with such questions, nevertheless the power to regulate the conduct of attorneys is held
concurrently by the Bar and the court."); Perillo, supra note 59, at 450 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Brower, 368
N.E.2d 1240, 1242 (N.Y. 1977)).
61. See, e.g., In re Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (noting objections to order capping individually-retained
attorneys' contingency fees asserted by "a group of five attorneys, identified as the Vioxx Litigation
Consortium"). For an interesting discussion of the ethical implications for individually-retained counsel of
objecting to contingency fee caps, see Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciariesand Fees: Preliminary
Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 1833 (2011), discussing objections by attorneys to the fee caps imposed in
recent MDL cases, and evaluating the contested boundary line between the contractual right to payment and
lawyers' fiduciary duties to clients.
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A. THE ETHICS DOCTRINE THE MDL TRIAL COURTS INVOKED
CONTEMPLATES PARTICULARIZED INQUIRIES
How does a trial court exercising its inherent authority to supervise members
of the bar know if a fee is reasonable or, conversely, excessive? The MDL trial
courts in Vioxx, Guidant,and Zyprexa provided one answer to this question: look
to ethics doctrine.62 These courts did not confine themselves to the ethics rules of
any particular state when exercising their inherent authority to regulate members
of the bar. In fact, they declined in each case to select a jurisdiction's ethics code,
or to address sticky choice of law questions regarding which jurisdiction's ethics
rules would apply. 63
62. See McMorrow, supra note 58, at 22 ("The inherent powers doctrine sets out the court's power, but it
does not articulate any standards or rules. It is a jurisdictional statement, not an articulation of norms. Because
the inherent powers doctrine is designed to supplement the federal rules, courts are left with a common law
process to guide them in using their inherent powers. When applied to attorney conduct, the federal courts do
not write on a blank slate. The scholarly debate over rules of attorney conduct in federal courts has often been
framed as if the ethics rules (Rules of ProfessionalConduct) are the dominant source of norms. Ethics rules are
important, but are not the only place to look for litigation ethics. Litigation ethics is supported by at least four
core anchors: the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and Evidence, the Rules of Professional
Conduct, norms of conduct established by custom or practice within the bar, and expectations framed by the
judges before whom the lawyer is appearing.") (footnote omitted). The MDL courts were not limited to ethics
rules to frame their exercise of inherent authority. For example, though they did not do so, they could have
rested the caps more squarely on agency or fiduciary law (of one or more jurisdictions), and the generally
accepted requirement that an agent charge "reasonable" fees. See Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on
the Citadel ofFiduciaryProtection:Ethics 2000's Revision ofModel Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1182
(2003) ("Our common-law heritage includes development of the three main branches of civil law: contracts,
torts, and fiduciary obligation .... The attorney-client relationship is the archetype for the fiduciary
obligation ... The principal fiduciary obligations imposed on the lawyer include ... [the duty of] acting fairly
towards the client. The duties to act fairly and in a non-self-interested fashion, in particular, relate to the
financial relationship between the lawyer and client .... In recent decades, the fiducial rights of clients have
been under assault.") (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). Since the courts in each MDL fee capping
decision linked their exercise of inherent authority to "ethics," this Article meets them on their own terms, and
examines their exercise of fee capping authority as they framed it, i.e., as an issue of ensuring ethical conduct by
individually-retained counsel.
63. In general, when regulating members of the bar, federal courts are not bound by any one set of ethics
rules. Depending on the federal court, the judges may look to the ABA Model Rules, the rules adopted by the
state in which the federal court sits, or, less often, the federal court's own detailed rules. See McMorrow, supra
note 58, at 8 ("An analysis of the citation patterns of federal courts reveals a healthy reference to either the state
or Model versions of the rules of professional conduct. But in practice, the rules of professional conduct
function like standards, serving to guide the federal courts but not unduly constrain their decision-making.");
David Hricik & Jae Ellis, Disparitiesin Legal Ethical Standards Between State and FederalJudicialSystems:
An Analysis and a Critique, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 577 (2000). While there is some variation in the precise
language used, the multi-factor tests deployed in the various jurisdictions consider many of the same factors as
those listed in Model Rule 1.5. Compare CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 4-200 ("Fees for Legal Services")
(2009) ("(A) A member shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee.
(B) Unconscionability of a fee shall be determined on the basis of all the facts and circumstances existing at the
time the agreement is entered into except where the parties contemplate that the fee will be affected by later
events.") with N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 ("Fees and Division of Fees") (2012) ("A lawyer shall not

make an agreement for, charge, or collect an excessive or illegal fee or expense. A fee is excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a reasonable lawyer would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is
excessive.").

78

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 26:59

In Vioxx, for example, Judge Fallon cited the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 1.5, to frame his discussion of the reasonableness requirement for
contingency fees, and then string cited cases from multiple jurisdictions.6 In
Guidant, Judge Frank cited federal court cases from a range of jurisdictions
capping excessive fees, invoking ethics principles without citing any particular
ethics rule.6 Similarly, in Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein discussed fee caps as part of
the judiciary's "well-established authority to exercise ethical supervision of the
bar" to "ensure that fees are in conformance with codes of ethics and professional
responsibility" without identifying a specific ethical code or code provision."
The factors considered in the ABA Model Rules, and in the professional rules
adopted by most states, contemplate a particularized assessment of reasonableness given the circumstances of each lawyer-client relationship and case.
Rule 1.5 of the ABA Model Rules identifies a non-exclusive list of factors to be
considered as part of the determination of whether a fee is unreasonable,
addressing such context-specific matters as the client's understanding of a
lawyer's likely opportunity costs, the work done by the lawyer in a particular
case, as well as the specific lawyer's experience and ability.67 The comment to the

64. In re Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 559. Objectors in Vioxx insisted that the court should consider whether
fees were excessive by reference of each jurisdiction's rules. Rather than finding the absence of any conflict of
law on the issue of fee reasonableness or excessiveness as a matter of ethics doctrine, or otherwise undertaking a
choice of law analysis, Judge Fallon held that a state-by-state analysis would be "squarely at odds with the
mandate of justice and efficiency established by the MDL statute," because conducting a fifty-state survey
would "drain judicial resources and would eliminate the efficiency that the MDL was designed to create." Id. at
563. Furthermore, the court held that circumventing a choice of law inquiry was ultimately fair, because the
claimants' attorneys were all tasked with navigating their clients through the same settlement matrix "regardless
of in which state their fee arrangement was consummated." Id. To some extent, what we are seeing under the
mantle of MDL litigation practice-i.e., MDL courts attempting to impose a uniform set of ethics norms, at least
with respect to attorneys' fees, on all related cases filed in the federal system-is reminiscent of past (failed)
efforts to develop a federal rules of attorney conduct. See McMorrow, supra note 58, at 7.
65. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174,
at *18 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008).
66. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488,492 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
67. ABA Model Rule 1.5 lists as factors to be considered:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]

Identification of contingency fees that are so excessive that they violate the ethics rules is much harder than
identifying other more obvious kinds of attorney misconduct with respect to fees, such as stealing from clients.
An example is the 2009 conviction of attorneys William Gallion and Shirley Cunningham, Jr., on multiple
counts of federal wire fraud, for their handling of client settlement funds in connection with the Kentucky
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Model Rule also mentions potentially applicable (presumably state) laws
imposing limits on contingent fees.6 8 Cases filed within a single MDL may
involve claims of varying difficulty (e.g., relating to individual proof of claims,
such as the availability or clarity of medical records, and other causation issues),
prosecuted by lawyers of dramatically different reputation or ability, who tailor
the prosecution of each case to its individual merits and/or according to the
lawyer's own practices, and whose opportunity costs vary dramatically. 69
Faithfully applying the factors listed in Model Rule 1.5 and in the fee provisions
of most ethics codes requires a court to evaluate each lawyer-client relationship
on its own terms.o Perhaps in recognition of the need for such a contextualized
inquiry, the MDL trial courts built room into their fee capping orders for
adjustments from the contingency fee caps, upon extraordinary showings.71 But
the courts inverted the ethics doctrine they purported to use to frame their
exercise of inherent authority. The attorney-client contract typically controls
absent extraordinary circumstances suggesting the need to prevent collection of
unreasonably excessive fees.72 Here, in the MDL fee capping orders, contractual

Fen-Phen diet drugs litigation. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements,
58 KANSAS L. REv.979,983-987 (2010) (chronicling lawyers' mishandling of client settlement funds in order to
circumvent and exceed contracted-for contingency fee amounts). That kind of outright theft of client funds
obviously violates ethics rules. It is not at all clear or obvious that any contingency fee amount above the caps
set in the MDL cases canvassed herein would have violated any ethics rule. Stealing from clients is always
wrong; but is a total 33% contingency fee, rather than, say, the 32% contingency fee cap imposed in Vioxx,
obviously wrong, as a matter of professional ethics?
68. MODEL RULEs R. 1.5 cmt. 3 ("Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a
ceiling on the percentage allowable . . . .").
69. Variation in the performance of individually-retained counsel prompted Judge Frank to bemoan:
In the majority of cases in this MDL, the Court believes that contingency fee contracts have worked just as
they should. Unfortunately, the Court has observed instances where this has not always occurred. For example,
the Court has received numerous communications from Claimants stating that their attorneys have never
contacted them or that their attorneys are making the Claimants complete, by themselves, all of the settlement
documents .... Some attorneys have filed documents with the Court that are wholly incomplete, based on the
wrong local rules, or submitted in handwritten form.
In re Guidant, 2008 WL 3896006, at *9.
70. See Amiee Lewis, Note, Limiting Justice: The Problem of JudiciallyImposed Caps on Contingent Fees
in Mass Actions, 31 REV. LmG. 209, 228-30 (2012) (analogizing across-the-board attorneys' fee caps in MDLs
to impermissible legislation from the bench, and contrasting such caps with the kind of ex ante, context-specific
inquiry Model Rule 1.5 contemplates).
71. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 ("However, upon further reflection,
this Court recognizes that, simply because of the large number of claims in this case, in theory and perhaps in
reality there may be one or more cases in which special treatment might be justified. In this particular case there
are over 50,000 claims originating in all fifty states. Accordingly it is not unreasonable to conclude that certain
rare circumstances might exist which would warrant a departure, in either direction, upwards or downwards,
from the universal fee cap."); In re Guidant,2008 WL 682174, at *20 ("Parties may petition the Special Masters
to have the 20% [cap] increased. . . .").
72. See, e.g., Alderman v. Pan Am World Airways, 169 F.3d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Courts have broad
authority to refuse to enforce contingent fee agreements that award fees that exceed a reasonable amount.
However, we have recognized that a contingency agreement is 'the freely negotiated expression both of a
[client's] willingness to pay more than a particular hourly rate to secure effective representation, and of an
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arrangements were presumptively excessive and in need of reform. The MDL
courts all cited the early case of Gair v. Peck7 3 for the proposition that a court
has relatively sweeping "inherent authority" to inquire into fee arrangements to
protect clients from excessive fees and conflicts of interest, even by establishing
broadly applicable caps." Gair's holding was narrower. Gair was an action
against the Justices of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
First Judicial Department, who had adopted a rule defining with specificity what
percentage contingency fees constituted "unreasonable" or "unconscionable"
fees as defined by the state ethics code. In upholding the lower court's exercise
of rule-making authority, the appellate court in Gair interpreted the challenged
rule narrowly, holding that the rule did nothing more than make provisions for
disciplining attorneys for receiving more from their clients than could legally be
collected under retainer agreements "even in the absence of the rule."7 6 As thus
interpreted, the challenged rule in Gair was not an across-the-board cap, but,
instead, was a "procedural aid in rendering effectual" the court's disciplinary
power by determining "where the burden of proof shall lie in the determination of
censurability of contingent fees in the individual case."
The fee cap orders in Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa were, unlike the rule
attorney's willingness to take the case despite the risk of nonpayment.' Therefore, a court should seek to enforce
the parties' intentions in a contingent fee agreement, as with any contract .... The district court's assessment of
a reasonable fee must begin with the agreement itself.") (citations omitted); McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard,
758 F.2d 97, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1985) ("It should therefore be the unusual circumstance that a court refuses to
enforce a contractual contingent attorney's fee arrangement because of events arising after the contract's
negotiation."); Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1982) (A contingency fee "agreement
between two freely consenting, competent adults will most often be controlling . . . ."); Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co.,
602 F.2d 1105, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Where, however, the lawyer and client have entered into a contractual
fee agreement prior to the litigation, the considerations stressed above argue in favor of deference to the parties'
contractual arrangement. The strong judicial reluctance to enforce the terms of a judicially fashioned bargain
upon the parties now presses in favor of honoring the express terms of the fee agreement."). See also discussion
infra Section III.B.
73. Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97 (N.Y. 1959).
74. In re Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 559; In re Guidant, at *18; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp.
2d 488,495 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
75. 6 N.Y.2d at 101 (quoting the disputed rule). The limited function of the disputed rule is explained as
follows:
Rule 4, sub judice, is essential in order to put on record the data necessary to be used as a foundation for
taking disciplinary action. Even under plaintiffs' theory of action, no objection would lie against the rule if every
lawyer filing a contingent fee retainer agreement were also required to file in his closing statement the amount of
time he devoted to the case and an enumeration of the other facts underlying the elements entering into the value
of the lawyer's services (citation omitted), That would enable the court after the event and in the individualcase
to determine whether the lawyer was censurable for charging a contingent fee that was unconscionable as being
out of all relation to the value of the work performed. The 'fee schedule' in rule 4 dispenses with supplying that
information where the agreed contingent fee is less than the percentages designated in the rule. If the stipulated
fee is greater, the attorney is required to supply the information necessary on which to form a conclusion
concerning the value of the professional services which have been rendered.
Id. at 109.
76. 6 N.Y.2d at 107-108.
77. Id. at 114.
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interpreted in Gair, not designed merely to shift the burden of proof, once
contingency fee percentages exceeded amounts that could be legally collected even in the absence of the fee capping orders. Instead, as explained in
Section II.A., above, the fee cap orders were driven by the procedural
circumstances presented by each of the MDLs in which they were entered, and,
specifically, were set by reference to and to create space for the fee set asides for
court-appointed common benefit counsel. The MDL fee cap orders were thus
neither an exercise of rule-making authority to aid in the enforcement of ethics
norms generally, as in Gair,nor the fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of
each case and retainer agreement that the ethics rules contemplate.
B. THE CASES CITED BY THE MDL TRIAL COURTS INVOLVE
PROTECTION OF INCOMPETENTS, OR AWARDS OF FEES IN
STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING OR CLASS ACTIONS
The cases cited by the MDL trial courts in the contingency fee capping orders
canvassed in this Article involved either the protection of persons deemed to be
legally incompetent, or the award of fees in statutory fee shifting cases or class
actions. Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., a 1982 Seventh Circuit decision prominently
cited in each of the MDL orders, is typical of the cases involving incompetents.
In that case, the Circuit Court upheld United State District Court Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois John F. Grady, Jr.'s decision to reduce attorneys'
fees provided for by a contingent fee contract. That case arose out of an accident
in which a Soo Line Railroad train collided with a car carrying Edward Rosquist,
Sr., his wife, and two children. The collision killed Rosquist's wife, and severely
injured his eldest child. Attorney William D. Maddux represented the plaintiffs
on a contingency fee basis. Mr. Maddux initially negotiated a structured
settlement of the case with a then-present value of $304,874,8 with attorneys'
fees to be paid separately by the defendant, totaling $250,000 payable over
five years. Because the case involved minors whose father was deemed incapable
of protecting their interests (due to financial and psychological problems),
Judge Grady scrutinized the settlement, and determined that it was not adequate.
He appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate the case and advise the court on
behalf of the most severely injured child. The case subsequently went to trial,
resulting in a $628,000 verdict. The district court entered judgment on the verdict
and ordered both the guardian ad litem and Mr. Maddux to submit petitions for
fees and expenses. Judge Grady capped Mr. Maddux's fee at 15 percent, down
from the 30 percent the original contingency fee contract permitted.7 9 In rejecting
Mr. Maddux's appeal from the fee order, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the
unique features of this case - exploitative behavior (appearing to potentially trade

78. All dollar figures are as described in the opinion, and are not adjusted to 2012 present value.
79. Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1982).

82

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 26:59

an early settlement and generous fees for compensation to the client) by an
attorney with regard to legal incompetents.8 0
Farmington Dowel-cited in Rosquist, and in the Guidant and Zyprexa fee
capping orders-similarly defines a relatively narrow set of circumstances under
which courts will exercise inherent authority to upset fee agreements entered into
by competent adults. Farmington Dowel involved a fee petition made by
plaintiffs' counsel upon successfully litigating a federal antitrust claim under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act. The jury
found $109,100 in damages, trebled it, and awarded $327,300 to the plaintiff,
Farmington Dowel. Farmington Dowel's attorneys then sought one-third of that
treble-damages amount as fees under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Due to the
statutory fee application, the district court learned that the plaintiffs' counsel's fee
agreement with Farmington Dowel entitled counsel to one-third of the trebled
damages, plus all the amount awarded as a "reasonable attorney's fee" pursuant
to Section 4 of the Act. The district court determined that the combination of
the contracted-for contingency fee and a Section 4 award would be excessive;
it thus declined to award fees under the Act, limiting plaintiffs' counsel to its
contingency fee contract.
The First Circuit upheld the ruling, holding that the trial court was justified in
limiting the Section 4 fee award in order to prevent attorneys practicing before it
from receiving "excessive" fees. 8 ' The court took pains to cabin the function of
the ethics doctrine, explaining that even with regard to Section 4 fee applications
under the federal antitrust law, the excessiveness inquiry under the professional
rules would be "reserved for exceptional circumstances," taking into account the
agreement of the parties, which, "if freely made, is not lightly set aside."82
Furthermore, the First Circuit explicitly distinguished between the reasonableness inquiry with regard to fees awarded under Section 4, and the "excessive-

80. Id. at 1110-11 ("In ordinary circumstances, trial courts may have no reason to inquire into the terms of an
attorney-client contract. But in this case, there were two children, one severely injured, both deprived of their
mother and in effect abandoned by their father.") The Seventh Circuit grounded the trial court's authority to cap
the contingency fee in this case in part in the "court's inherent power of supervision over the bar to examine the
attorney's fee for conformance with the reasonable standard of the Code of Ethics." Id. The Seventh Circuit did
not set forth a specific standard for defining unreasonable fees that violated the Code of Ethics; instead, it
highlighted the trial court's discretion to review for reasonableness under the particular circumstances of the
case. Id. Several other authorities cited in the recent spate of decisions capping contingency fees similarly
involved incompetents. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42 (1884) (cited in Guidant, at *18; Zyprexa,
424 F. Supp. 2d at 492) (confirming ability of guardian ad litem to contract for legal services on behalf of minors
on a contingency basis); see also Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981) (cited in Vioxx,
650 F. Supp. 2d at 554, 557, 560-61) (approving trial court's imposition of a contingency fee cap,
jurisdictionally, on plaintiff's counsel's appeal to the trial court's equitable powers to review and ratify the
proposed settlement of a claim of a minor as to whom the court appointed a guardian ad litem, and where
plaintiff's counsel originally sought a 40 percent contingency fee for a case that settled two months after filing
for $2.5 million).
81. Farmington Dowel Prod. Co v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 87 (1st Cir. 1969).
82. Id. at 88-90.
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ness" inquiry ethics doctrine implicates. Among other differences, the Section 4
inquiry was generally expostfacto, assessing the work done during the life of the
case, whereas the ethics inquiry assessed the reasonableness of the contingency
fee at the time the agreement was made.8 3 Similarly, the ethics inquiry involved a
distinct test; rather than the "reasonableness" inquiry involved in awarding fees
under Section 4, a review for excessiveness under the ethics rule attempted to
define "the outer limit of reasonableness." Finally, it should be noted that the
negotiated fee percentage was undisturbed; the court in FarmingtonDowel made
its adjustments solely in regard to the statutory fee under Section 4.4
The cases cited in the MDL fee capping orders do not support the adjustment
of contingency contracts negotiated by legally competent clients as a regularlydeployed tool for allocating fees in MDL. Instead, the cases cited by the MDL
courts suggest that judicial intervention in privately negotiated fee contracts to
prevent attorneys from earning excessive fees is an exceptional event, often to
protect unusually vulnerable plaintiffs.85 To the extent courts' interventions in
contingency fees stray from this setting, it is typically because they are required
to set the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee, under a fee shifting statute, or in connection
with a class action fee award.
C. THE DISSONANCE BETWEEN ETHICS DOCTRINE AND THE
PROCEDURAL ISSUE OF ALLOCATING FEES AMONG
LAYERS OF COUNSEL IN MDLS; A PATH FORWARD
MDL trial courts certainly can use ethics doctrine to police for excessive
fees. But as the decisions their fee-capping orders cite demonstrate, doing so
would involve a different approach than the imposition of across-the-board fee
caps used in the MDL proceedings discussed in this Article. First, the need for
court intervention of any kind, as an ethics matter, would be assessed on an
individualized basis, considering each lawyer-client fee agreement and relationship, applying the contextual, case-specific factors discussed in both the Model
Rules and relevant case law, discussed above. Second, that assessment would be

83. Id. at 89.
84. Id. at 90. Other cases cited in the MDL courts' fee capping orders similarly involved either statutory fees
or fees awarded in class actions. See generally Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (cited in Guidant, at *9)
(civil rights case involving statutory fees); Int'l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F2d 1255 (8th
Cir. 1980) (antitrust case in which losing defendant challenged statutory attorneys' fee award to plaintiff, and
where contingency fee agreement was discussed as part of the determination of the statutory fee award rather
than as justification for a cap placed on the contingency fee contract itself, cited in Guidant, at *18); In re
Infospace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (cited in Guidant, at *4, *9, *15) (federal
securities class action).
85. Of the three case studies examined here, only Zyprexa involved particularly vulnerable plaintiffs; nothing
distinguishes the plaintiffs in Vioxx and Guidant from typical products liability mass torts involving personal
injuries. See, e.g., Silver & Miller, supranote 29, at 117 ("We know of no physical basis on which to distinguish
the Guidant and Vioxx claimants from other plaintiffs with serious injuries.").
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initiated in exceptional cases, for example where the plaintiffs are so vulnerable
as to be incapacitated, as noted in the authority on which the MDL fee capping
orders rests. Finally, ethics doctrine would be used to identify specific fee awards
that violate professional norms of reasonableness, rather than to achieve case
management goals, such as promoting aggregate, non-class contractual settlements via the award of enhanced fees to court-appointed common benefit
counsel, the current driver of fee caps in the MDL proceedings canvassed in this
Article, as demonstrated in Section II.A., above. Put differently, ethics doctrine
prohibiting unreasonably excessive fees will apply only in limited cases within
particular MDLs, as an exceptional rather than a routine event, to police for
unreasonably excessive fees, rather than to regularly establish common benefit
fees as a tax on individually retained counsel.
Procedural doctrine can be developed in the MDL setting that functionally
matches the procedural doctrine that structures decision-making regarding fees
in class actions. Class action fees are not determined by reference to ethics doctrine such as ethics prohibitions on the charging of unreasonably excessive fees.
Instead, as noted, in class actions, the fee award to class counsel, which is
analogous to the award in the MDL setting to common benefit counsel, is rooted
in the equitable common fund doctrine, or in fee shifting statutes associated with
particular substantive law claims, application of which is structured by a rule of
procedure, Rule 23(h), in the service of expressly procedural goals.86 In the MDL
setting, in proceedings resolved not via class aggregation under Rule 23, but,
instead, via contractual aggregation, as were Vioxx, Guidant,and Zyprexa, the fee
allocation questions would not be resolved by reference to the common fund
doctrine, or, in products liability mass tort cases, pursuant to a fee-shifting
statute. Instead, to be functionally equivalent to the fee award in class actions,
MDL common benefit fees should be awarded either pursuant to terms added to
the MDL statute via Congressional authorization, or via the trial courts' exercise
of their inherent authority to establish case management structures that facilitate
the goals of MDL consolidation, the same authority that, for example, allows
MDL trial courts to appoint common benefit counsel in the first instance. That

86. See supra notes 10-12.
87. See supra note 40; see also Silver & Miller, supra note 29, at 109 ("Over the long history of MDLs,
judges have awarded lead attorneys billions of dollars in fees and cost reimbursements. Typically, fee awards
range from 4 percent to 6 percent of total recoveries, but smaller and larger percentages can be found. This
practice supposedly rests on the common fund doctrine, a creature of the law of restitution which undergirds fee
awards in class actions. Yet the Supreme Court has never said the doctrine applies in MDLs, which are
consolidations rather than class suits, and the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment suggests otherwise: "'By comparision with class actions, court-imnposed
fees to appointed counsel in consolidated litigation frequently appear inconsistent with restitution principles,"'
citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 30 cmt.

b (Tentative Draft

No. 3, 2004)).
88. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 770 (2011) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at
Fl. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (1977) ("The Fifth Circuit has long recognized that a court's
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is, the "inherent power" would be the power of the Court to realize the statutory
goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which is not a question of regulating counsel to police
for excessive fees, but, instead, raises a cluster of important questions about the
nature and goals of MDL aggregation as a case management device. Answers to
these questions would dictate the terms of a formula or framework for allocating
fees between common benefit counsel and individually retained counsel in
MDLs, one which would actually be used to award and allocate fees pursuant to
its terms.
These procedural issues, with which courts and commentators have long
struggled in the class setting, have not been squarely addressed by Congress (via
direction through amendment of the MDL statute) or by Courts confronting fee
questions in non-class MDLs: How do we account for both the similarities and
the differences between class actions and MDLs, in terms of the degree of litigant
autonomy and involvement?89 For example, trial courts do not typically pass
judgment on the fairness or adequacy of non-class aggregate settlements; but
given the extraordinary degree of disenfranchisement of individual plaintiffs
within the aggregate of an MDL, should they? 90 Is the court's role as fiduciary for
the MDL plaintiffs, if there is one, limited to MDL settlements, or to MDL
settlements in which the court plays a substantial role in either negotiation or
implementation? To the extent the attorney fee lever is available either to
facilitate a desired degree of aggregation in the MDL context, or to otherwise
help the court manage the proceeding justly and efficiently, when precisely can or
should the court intervene, and pursuant to what standards? Which fee formulas
provide proper compensation and incentives to both court-appointed common
benefit counsel and individually-retained counsel, each of whom provide key
power to consolidate and manage litigation necessarily implies a corollary authority to appoint lead or liaison
couinsel and to compensate them for their work.".)
89. See Judith Resnik, Comparedto What?: ALIAggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Processand
of Lawyers'Powers, 79 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 628, 630-31 (2011) ("The procedural project of the twenty-first
century is figuring out what to do with all the diverse rights-holders, eligible to pursue enforcement of their
entitlements in courts operating under" expanded theories of due process in conjunction with an expanded array
of methods "group cases together through joinder, consolidation, class action, and multidistrict litigation");
Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2010)
("Moving outside the parameters of the class action means shifting into new settings a similar need for a
centralizing mechanism and, crucially, legal regulation of the manner in which that mechanism may exercise
coercive power. This Article seeks to break down the prevalent supposition of a neat division between the
perceived need for legal regulation of class actions and the supposedly benighted world of autonomous
individual lawsuits."); see generally Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the ClassAction: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 519 (2003) (questioning disparate
treatment of class and non-class litigation, in terms of the procedural protections afforded to plaintiffs).
90. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee, III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, supra note 16, at 801-02; see generally Alexandra N. Rothman,
Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial "Approval" and "Rejection" Out of Non-Class Mass
Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 319 (2011) (presenting a procedural argument for why non-class mass
settlement are not subject to judicial approval and rejection, despite efforts by certain MDL judges to evaluate
recent non-class aggregate settlements).
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services? 9 ' That question implicates an even more fundamental procedural
question: whether and to what extent MDL transfer and coordination converts
individual litigation to group litigation to a sufficient extent as to justify court
interventions in the form of the allocation or establishment of attorneys' fees, and
the approval of settlements.
Ethics doctrine tells us nothing about these procedural questions and choices.
As explored further in Section V, below, framing free award and allocation
decisions under ethics doctrine that merely seeks to police for excessive fees
diverts participants in the MDL process from the core issues. Why did the MDL
trial courts in Vioxx, Guidant,and Zyprexa push the boundaries of ethics doctrine
pertaining to excessive fees to justify procedural moves connected to the
management and resolution of MDL litigation? The following Section explores
this question.
IV. UNRESOLVED TENSIONS WITHIN THE MDL GOVERNANCE REGIME
EXPLAIN WHY TRIAL COURTS ARE USING ETHICS DOCTRINE
To ACHIEVE PROCEDURAL GOALS
Borrowing from theoretical developments in political theory, I use the term
"governance regime" to refer to the rules, judicial decisions, practices, and norms
that structure MDL litigation. 9 2 MDL governance is dynamic and polycentric;9

91. See Resnik & Curtis, Contingent Fees in Mass Torts supra note 18, at 440 ("Where aggregate mass torts
and more typical contingency fee arrangements converge is in the search for a 'correct' fee. The ever-present
issue in the effort is the design of a metric. Should the baseline be the amount an individual attorney might have
received, were she or he to bill on an hourly basis? Should the measurement be a percentage of the value of the
victory? If so, how should victories be valued?").
92. See Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Carolyn J. Heinrich & Carolyn J. Hill, Studying Governance and Public
Management: Challenges and Prospects, 10 J. PUB. ADM. REs. & THEORY 233, 233-34 (2002), [hereinafter
Lynn, Heinrich & Hill] ("The term 'governance' is widely used in both public and private sectors, in
characterizing both global and local arrangements, and in reference to both formal and informal norms and
understandings. Because the term has strong intuitive appeal, precise definitions are seldom thought to be
necessary by those who use it. As a result, when authors identify 'governance' as important to achieving policy
or organizational objectives, it may be unclear whether the reference is to organizational structures,
administrative processes, managerial judgment, systems of incentives and rules, administrative philosophies, or
combinations of these elements. Despite ambiguity of definitions, governance generally refers to the means for
achieving direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organizations on
behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute."); see David L. Levy & Peter J. Newell, Business Strategy
and InternationalEnvironmental Governance: Toward a Neo-Gramscian Synthesis, 2 GLOBAL ENVrTL POL, 84,
85 (2002), available at http://www.mitpressjoumals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152638002320980632 [hereinafter
Levy & Newell] ("Regimes thus comprise networks of actors, routines, principles, and rules, simultaneously
constituting and disciplining their subjects, constraining and enabling patterns of behavior.").
93. See Claudia Pahl-Wostl, A Conceptual Frameworkfor Analysing Adaptive Capacity and Multi-level
LearningProcessesin Resource Governance Regimes, 19 GLOBAL ENvT. CHANGE J. 354, 356 (2009), available
at www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha ("Governance regimes are thus characterized by self-organization,
emergence and diverse leadership."); Id. at 357 ("More generally, polycentric governance systems are defined
here as complex, modular systems where differently sized governance units with different purpose,
organization, spatial location interact to form together a largely self-organized governance regime.").
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multiple actors-Congress, trial courts, appellate courts, and differentlyorganized counsel-contribute to a constellation of approaches that nevertheless
appears to be sufficiently bounded that the term "MDL practice" is intelligible.
To assess MDL governance issues, including questions about attorneys' fees, in
proper context, it helps to define the regime, to understand its constituent parts
and their relationships to each other. That task involves identifying the
stakeholders in the MDL governance regime, i.e., the entities and interest groups
whose activities create MDL practice.9 4 Because stakeholders have distinct
interests, they are likely to conflict with each other over the rules, practices, and
norms that are constitutive of the regime. "Governance is, therefore, inherently
political, involving bargaining and compromise, winners and losers, ambiguity
and uncertainty."9 5
In the context of MDL litigation practice, to speak of a governance regime is
really a way of organizing observations, or, put differently, to give expression to
an intuition: The MDL governance regime consists of two principal coalitions of
stakeholders with distinct views of the nature and purpose of MDL litigation. The
coalitions consist of those on the side of litigant autonomy and those who are
more supportive of aggregation. The fault line appears where the pressure to
aggregate meets the ideal of litigant autonomy.
A. THOSE FAVORING AUTONOMY AND OPPOSING AGGREGATION
On the side of litigant autonomy are a Congress and a Supreme Court
suspicious of large-scale litigation (though open to large-scale resolution of mass
torts); plaintiffs' firms whose business models depend on either the trial or
individual claims, or the warehousing of large numbers of claims that are then
settled as a bloc; and business interests that have historically been in favor of
aggregation only for purposes of facilitating mass settlements.9 6 Congressional
attitudes towards large-scale litigation are unstable, and impossible to characterize precisely. But, Congress has, for the past two decades, regularly leaned
toward limiting large-scale litigation. This can be seen by comparing 1968 MDL
statute itself, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which enabled large scale administratively
aggregated actions in the federal system, to more recent procedural legislation
presenting obstacles to aggregation and enacted since the mid-1990s, including
94. See Lynn, Heinrich & Hill, supra note 92, at 5 ("A given governance regime distributes resources and
responsibility for functions and operations within and between offices and organizations in the public and
private sectors . .. Through these distributions, governance links the objectives of various diverse stakeholders
(e.g., citizens expressing themselves as voters, respondents to polls, and consumers; organized interest groups;
and elected and appointed officials) with the activities that take place at the operational levels of government.").
95. See id.
96. See generally SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE MONEY CAN BuY: CORPORATE GREED ON TRIAL (2011)
(setting up, in the tension it documents between Vioxx plaintiffs' attorneys Mark Lanier and Chris Seeger, the
larger tensions between and conflicting interests of counsel who organize their practices around individual
litigation versus MDL leadership insiders).
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the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act9 7 and the Class Action Fairness
Act,9 8 both of which were designed to address perceived abuses in large-scale
litigation. 99 Congress's unwillingness to enact legislation to modify or address
litigation-disaggregating decisions from the Supreme Court, described below, is
equally revealing of the political landscape that has shaped Congressional
activity for the past few decades."'O Similarly, comparing the classic 1985
decision enabling large-scale litigation, PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts,1 o' with
a string of more recent decisions-including Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 0 2 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,10 3 Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,'10 4 Taylor v. Sturgell,'0 5 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,10 6

97. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 77-78).
98. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711-1453).
99. See Michael A. Perino, Didthe PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913,
915 (2003) ("First, the PSLRA was intended to reduce the costs that securities actions impose on the capital
markets by discouraging the filing of non-meritorious suits. Second, Congress wanted to reduce litigation risk
for high technology issuers, which it found were disproportionately targeted in securities class actions. Third,
Congress wanted to reduce the 'race to the courthouse' whereby class actions were filed soon after significant
stock price declines, apparently with very little prefiling investigation."); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class
Action FairnessAct in Perspective: The Old and the New in FederalJurisdictionalReform, 156 U. PENN. L.
REv. 1823, 1825, 1851-56 (2008) (detailing the "inherently political and social nature" of federal jurisdictional
reform, and characterizing CAFA as a response to the proliferation of large-scale class actions in state court,
which occurred after federal courts limited the availability of the device in the mid-1990s).
100. Observers are skeptical of the likelihood of the enactment of recently proposed bills responsive to
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) or Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011). See, e.g., Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the ArbitrationFairnessAct,SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 13,
2011) http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/concepcion-and-the-arbitration-faimess-act/ (noting that the reintroduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act, a recent iteration of which responds to Concepcion, has little chance of
success); see Alison Frankel, On the Case: Will Congress Roll Back SCOTUS Reversals?, THOMSON REuTERs
NEWS & INSIGHT (June 24, 2011) http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.
aspx?id=20236 ("But looking at the recent history of legislative attempts to undo Supreme Court precedent
doesn't offer a whole lot of hopes for plaintiffs, as even the advocacy groups acknowledge.").
101. PhilipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 798 (1985) (facilitating large-scale litigation by finding
that due process is satisfied by notice and an opportunity to be heard, justifying exercise of jurisdiction over and
rendering of a preclusive judgment as to non-forum class members who do not affirmatively opt in to a class).
102. Lexecon, Inc., 523 U.S. at 40-41.
103. 521 U.S. at 592-94 (1997) (sprawling asbestos personal injury settlement class illegitimate under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23, due to absence of adequate representation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), and failure to satisfy
predominance requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
104. See generally, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (discussing the traditional indicia of a
limited fund-including a "fund" with a definitely ascertained limit, all of which would be distributed to satisfy
all those with liquidated claims based on a common theory of liability, by an equitable, pro rata
distribution-are presumptively necessary to justify mandatory class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(B)).
105. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2009) (rejecting expansive doctrine of virtual representation
and noting: "[t]he application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the 'deep-rooted
historical tradition that everyone should have his own day in court"') (citing and quoting Richards v. Jefferson
County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
106. Supra note 100.
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07
and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion1
demonstrates that, for the past few
decades, the Supreme Court has consistently been more interested in marking the
boundaries of aggregation, or preserving ideals of litigant autonomy, than in
enabling or facilitating aggregation. Though each recent decision was arguably
driven by peculiar concerns other than specifically limiting large-scale litigation
-e.g., statutory interpretation in Lexecon, or promoting arbitration in Concepcion-these decisions, taken as a whole, represent a sustained effort to cabin the
systemic urge to aggregate. The third major group of stakeholders in the MDL
governance regime with deep misgivings about centralization and aggregation
includes the plaintiffs' law firms whose organizational structure and/or practice
models benefit from fragmentation of litigation."os It is easier to say who is not in
this group than to characterize its members. This grouping of stakeholders
excludes firms consistently appointed to leadership positions in MDLs, many of
which are identifiable repeat players in large-scale litigation.1 09 The range of
relatively disenfranchised plaintiffs' firms is broad; while they are often smaller
and less well capitalized, little unites these firms other than an ambivalence about
or outright suspicion of the MDL process, and, most importantly, a lack of faith in
their likelihood of being appointed to leadership positions. They include but are
not limited to firms that rely on advertising campaigns and routinization of law
practice to collect claims to be bundled for settlement,o as well as firms that
generate value in their case portfolios from actually trying individual cases,
rather than by engineering mass settlements.' The last group of stakeholders in
the anti-aggregation coalition includes large business interests, which have
traditionally supported aggregation only in the limited setting of settlement,
where they benefit from broad preclusion, and have traditionally fought against

107. Id.
108. The observations in this paragraph regarding the structure of the plaintiffs' bar are based in part on the
Author's direct observations while prosecuting MDLs. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Health Care Corp. Billing
Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 2002) (identifying the Author as one of the counsel in MDL No.
1227 performing common benefit work by litigating MDL discovery issues); In re Nazi Era Cases Against
German Defendants Litig., MDL No. 1337, 198 F.R.D. 429,423, 434,435 (D.N.J. 2000) (identifying the Author
as one of the counsel involved in the prosecution of the coordinated claims).
109. See Morris A. Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs' Class Action Attorneys, (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 14) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid= 1924278) ("There is yet
another way to demonstrate the supremacy of larger firms in class litigation: randomly selecting nearly any case
management order appointing plaintiffs' attorneys and firms to leadership positions in high profile MDL
litigation matters reveals that, when presented with a choice, judges gravitate toward established, big plaintiffs'
firms.").
110. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 1485, 1488,
1491-92, n.19 (2009) (describing the practices of the cadre of attorneys who make their living "settling large
numbers of claims almost entirely outside the court system," characterizing them as "settlement mills," and
defining them as having characteristics including high-volume personal injury practices, dependent on
aggressive advertising for client harvesting, and taking few cases to trial, and noting parallels to mass tort law
firms).
111. Supra note 96.
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large-scale litigation.' 1 2
B. PROPONENTS OF AGGREGATION
Against this lot of bedfellows is an opposing coalition of MDL stakeholders
whose interests in aggregation align. They include the deep-pocket players in the
upper strata of the plaintiffs' bar, typically larger firms that tend to get appointed
as repeat players on MDL leadership committees, along with the MDL Panel
itself and trial court judges, who face institutional pressures toward efficient
aggregation. The JPMDL, which, as noted, is largely autonomous,1 13 is seen as
favoring aggregation.1 4 In selecting judges to whom to transfer large-scale
litigation proceedings, the Panel often selects trial court judges with a demonstrated interest in facilitating the management and resolution of these cases,'" 5
including Judges Weinstein and Fallon, who have both commented on the role of
the MDL judge in actually resolving coordinated litigation, rather than just
managing it for pre-trial purposes.' 16 These judges consistently appoint plain-

112. Businesses rarely have the occasion to speak directly and generally about multidistrict litigation or other
aggregation mechanisms, though the U.S. Chamber of Commerce actively seeks to protect business interests
from large-scale litigation. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey:
Inaccurate, Unfairand Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STrUD. 969, 970 (2009) (The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce uses its liability "survey in court to support legal arguments to narrow actions against businesses.").
To the extent defense lawyers' stated attitudes toward aggregate litigation are reflective of their clients' interests,
they are also revealing. See, e.g., Jim Beck, Latest Draft OfALI PrinciplesOfAggregate Litigation:Three Steps
Forward,Two Steps Back, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (May 9,2007) http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/
05/latest-draft-of-ali-principles-of.html ("As defense attorneys, we don't like aggregated litigationparticularly attempts to try cases on an aggregated basis .... For one thing, any time litigation is aggregated the
stakes are raised in direct proportion to the extent of the aggregation.").
113. Supranote 14.
114. See Marcus, Toward a Maximalist Use, supra note 14 at 2266, 2269 ("[T]he operation of § 1407 has
tended in a maximalist direction. One ingredient in that thrust has been the understandable . .. tendency of
transferee judges to take seriously their responsibility to resolve the cases that they have received from the
Panel. Others flow from the Panel's approach to its job, one that emerged ... early in its operation .... The
tenor of the Panel's early decisions reinforces the impression. Its emphasis on judicial efficiency bespoke an
impulse toward combination .... [T]he Panel's willingness to combine cases, and its confidence that the
combination will be for the advantage of the litigants as well as serve judicial economy, is sometimes striking.")
115. See, e.g., Richards, JPML Selection of Districtand Judge, supra note 14, at 340-42 (surveying factors
that appear to influence transfer orders, including the experience of transferee judges, specifically with regard to
the handling of MDLs, a factor the Panel particularly emphasizes when transferring to a district in which no
constituent actions are pending, and one which seems particularly influential in products liability and sales
practices litigation MDLs).
116. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS ToRT LmGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS
AcloNs, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTPARTY DEVICES 102 (995) ("Much has been said about the role of

the judge in the settlement of mass tort cases, particularly the propriety of 'managerial' judging in these
cases .... Few dispute that, at a minimum, a court's strong interest in the efficient and effective management of
its docket justifies a more active role in these complex cases. This active role naturally includes acting as a
clearinghouse for information and adviser in the course of settlement negotiations."); Fallon, Grabill & Wynne,
supra note 25, at 2330 ("Indeed, by establishing a mechanism for conducting 'bellwether' or 'representative'
trials, the transferee court can enhance and accelerate both the MDL process itself and the global resolutions that
often emerge from that process.").
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tiffs' counsel who share the MDL trial court judges' penchant for using the MDL
process to achieve global resolution of claims.' 17 Moreover, these plaintiffs'
firms are often organized in such a way as to make them dependent on aggressive
use of aggregation mechanisms for their financial success. The firms handling
common benefit work organize their practices around such work, by hiring
lawyers capable of handling intensive briefing, as well as common fact and
expert discovery. Since these firms do not necessarily collect and resolve large
numbers of individual claims, those that routinely assume leadership positions in
MDL matters rely on fee set-asides for common benefit counsel to make MDL
litigation profitable for them.
Conversely, firms that are structured to primarily obtain and warehouse claims
for processing and settlement will not need to hire lawyers capable of handling
complex legal briefing or argument, and will need to organize the firm to have
substantial non-lawyer staff, such as paralegals or clerks, who can process large
numbers of client claims; their law firms are, in effect, volume businesses." 8 The
dividing line between plaintiffs' firms that are wholeheartedly enthusiastic, and,
those that are deeply ambivalent about facilitating MDL aggregation is to some
extent a structural one, having to do with law firm organization and business
practices.
The fee orders capping contingency fees of individually-retained counsel in
Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa, though framed in the language of ethics, were
part-and-parcel of a series of related moves designed to mediate this basic tension
animating the MDL governance regime. Thus, the orders were designed to
achieve the facilitation of MDL aggregation, including specifically the resolution
of the MDL proceedings by non-class aggregate settlements, by carving out
enhanced payments to court-appointed common benefit counsel, and by making
room for such payments through caps on individually-retained counsel's contingency fees. Even if fee-capping orders preceded the actual award of fees to
court-appointed common benefit counsel, the caps were imposed in anticipation
of such payments.11 9 But by framing the fee caps primarily in terms of ethics, i.e.,
in terms of policing for excessive fees, the courts avoided expressly confronting

117. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prod.Liab. Litig., EEF, MDL No. 1657, at 3, n.4 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2011) ("Some
have suggested that the attorneys themselves should select the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee with the attorney
with the largest number of plaintiff cases having the laboring oar ... . Having a large number of cases in the
MDL often indicates skill at advertising, but does not guarantee the best lawyering or even the selection of those
best suited to handle the matter in a cooperative endeavor which is crucial for MDL proceedings . . . . [T~he
efficient and successful resolution of an MDL is dependent on coordination and cooperation of lead counsel for
all sides.").
118. Supra note 110.
119. See Resnik & Curtis, ContingentFees in Mass Torts, supranote 18 at 440 ("Where aggregate mass torts
and more typical contingency fee arrangements converge is in the search for a 'correct' fee. The ever-present
issue in the effort is the design of a metric. Should the baseline be the amount an individual attorney might have
received, were she or he to bill on an hourly basis? Should the measurement be a percentage of the value of the
victory? If so, how should victories be valued?").
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the thorny procedural questions that must be answered as a part of determining
fees to be awarded to common benefit counsel, or allocated between such counsel
and individually retained counsel.
The basic tension animating the MDL governance regime thus remains
unresolved. Absent greater and more direct resolution of this fundamental
animating tension, either in the form of amendments to the MDL statute to
address the underlying procedural questions MDL non-class aggregate settlements pose, or in the form of some signal from appellate courts that the
"quasi-class action" theory, a theory of the courts' inherent authority to use fees
to achieve procedural goals of MDL transfer and coordination, or some
alternative procedural basis for regulating MDL fees, has legs, trial courts will be
left with only so much room to maneuver doctrinally. To move past the current
stalemate in the MDL governance regime requires the mustering of a resolve by
Congress or courts that has, thus far, proved to be elusive.
V. INDIRECTION COMES AT APRICE
The problem with using courts' inherent authority to supervise counsel's
ethical conduct in order to achieve procedural goals is that we obfuscate and
avoid making the kinds of procedural choices a more direct approach entails. The
real question in each of these MDL cases was not whether individually-retained
counsel violated ethics rules by charging excessive fees, a determination that
illuminates only what is beyond the pale. Other questions should have been
paramount: What is the proper role of the MDL trial court with respect to fees,
and with respect to the allocation of fees among layers of counsel, in the service
of what case management goals; and what specific fee calculation and allocation
methodologies would best achieve those goals? To the extent the current
stalemate in the MDL governance regime prompts courts to bypass these basic
procedural questions, the answers, themselves grounded in the doctrine developed to manage MDL litigation, will also remain stunted.
Because it does not ask or answer these core questions at issue in MDL
non-class settlements, the ethics doctrine to which MDL trial courts have recently
turned is of limited applicability. It may not be available, at least as currently
framed, to justify fee awards and allocations in connection with other MDL
settlements. 1 2 0 Each of the MDL courts whose fee capping orders is canvassed in
this Article felt compelled to make certain findings to attempt to fit within the

120. See Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict
LitigationJudges, 30 Miss. C. L. REv. 237,250 (2011) ("Ifthe mix of inherent judicial powers, analogy to class
actions, the MDL statute, and the altered status of the attorney-client relationship under MDL consolidation is
enough to justify Judge Fallon's capping order, a question is how far that authority goes. Is it present in all MDL
consolidations (even though the statute does not specifically provide for it) - . . ? Or is it present only in some
MDL and ordinary consolidation cases in which there are special concerns over a conflict of interest between
attorneys and clients or special needs for a more expansive form of case management?").
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confines of ethics doctrine, including that the plaintiffs were particularly
vulnerable, and that, absent caps, fees would have been excessive. Does that
mean there is no role for the trial court with respect to allocating and setting
attorneys' fees when the plaintiffs are not particularly infirm, or where the
individually-retained attorneys' fee agreements, on balance, are not so extreme as
to violate ethics rules? Ethics doctrine should not be the fixed star for navigating
these procedural waters.
Indirection not only defers resolution of difficult procedural questions, but,
also, in any one proceeding, allows fees to be set without any guiding star
whatsoever. What was the "correct" fee to be awarded to common benefit counsel
in Voxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa, for example, and how does any enhanced fee
negotiated by common benefit, and made available in part through fee capping
orders, relate to the ideal fee? Because the question was not clearly asked or
answered in each specific case, we do not know. This lack of clarity calls the
legitimacy of fee allocations within such MDLs into question, and suggests the
possibility that enhanced fees made available under non-class aggregate settlements to common benefit counsel may be established by reference to common
benefit counsel's perceived self interest, rather than as a function of the needs of
all participants in the MDL.12 1
Whether Section 1407 is outfitted with an appropriately tailored analog to
Rule 23(h), or, more likely, trial courts independently articulate and apply a clear
test for awarding and allocating fees to MDL counsel in connection with
non-class aggregate settlements, the path to be trudged cuts through the center of
the tensions animating the MDL governance regime. Of necessity, it forces trial
courts to more definitively resolve it, by considering how and why MDL
non-class aggregate settlements differ from class action settlements, and how
those differences should impact the way fees are awarded and allocated in such
matters.

121. See Silver & Miller, supra note 29, at 139 (variations in fee caps among specific MDLs may reflect,
among other considerations, "the size of the reduction each judge thought the limited attorneys in his MDL
would accept without making a fuss.").

